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- On April 12, 2021
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Washington, DC, May 21, 2014 – The Arusha Accords, a peace agreement signed in August 1993 between the Rwandan government and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), have failed in the worst way that peace agreements can fail. Documents released today by the National Security Archive and the Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum attest to the role of the international community in the non-implementation of the demobilization program, an important part of the Arusha agreements that eventually led to genocide in April 1994. Peter Tarnoff, Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs, said that “while the [Rwandan] government is sensitive to the IMF and World Bank proposals, the bank`s staff has found that it faces many constraints and will soon make crucial decisions.” He added that “the Bank also supports a unDP-chaired roundtable on Rwanda to assess humanitarian needs (including demobilization), but only when a comprehensive macroeconomic agreement has been reached and financial resources are found to support it.” UNCTAD`s Work Programme on International Investment Agreements (IAA) actively supports policy makers, government officials and other IIA stakeholders in the IIA reform to make them more conducive to sustainable development and inclusive growth. International investment rules are established at bilateral, regional, inter-regional and multilateral levels. It requires policy makers, negotiators, civil society and other stakeholders to be well informed about foreign direct investment, international investment agreements (AI) and their effects on sustainable development. Key objectives of UNCTAD`s IIA work programme – Reform of the International Investment Agreements (IIA) regime to improve the dimension of sustainable development; A comprehensive analysis of key issues arising from the complexity of the international investment regime; Development of a wide range of instruments to support the development of a more balanced international investment policy. “Between the signing of the agreement and the beginning of the genocide… This whole issue of the demobilization and reintegration of soldiers has been the subject of great attention… All this problem of reintegrating people into a society where there is not much development, that does not grow… most of the jobs are in the public sector, not the private sector, and it was very hard, and very smart people were working there. How do you do that, how do you do it? The Arusha negotiations were compounded by the fact that the various divisions between the political parties occurred within the Rwandan government delegation. This is evident from various reports by American observers (document 8) and from the reports of the Rwandan delegation sent to President Habyarimana in Kigali (document 14). The major differences of opinion were the same: how to integrate the military, the size of the entire force and the shares of the RPF and former government forces that would constitute the new Rwandan armed forces (Document 9).
The RPF and the Rwandan government were also divided on how to choose, on the soldiers and officers to be demobilized, on how to successfully reintegrate them into society and on the security problems associated with the demobilization process (Document 7). The Arusha Accords were a UN-sponsored agreement between the RPF, a predominantly Tutsi rebel group, and the Rwandan government. This message deals specifically with the military power-sharing section (demobilization and reintegration) of the Arusha Agreements, which was a minor but crucial part of the broader political context in which the genocide took place.